

p.1 Purpose: (1) Reduce the flow and/or to increase the cost of the continued infiltration of men and supplies from North to SVN, (2) Moral of the South, (3) Price to the North of aggression in South.

p.2 Results: (1) Infiltration of men and supplies made more difficult and costly. And, Secretary of Defense says complete interdiction of supplies not possible, and unlikely that air strikes or other means could choke off the minimum amounts needed to support -- sporadic and relatively small-scale enemy action. (2) Moral sustained, (3) A high price is being paid.

p.2 Note: View consistent with OER judgment. Also can it be inferred from "other means" that the Secretary of Defense believes that "the certain course of action" will not work? As per OER judgment.

p.3 Geography makes interdiction even more difficult than in Korea.

p.3 NVN is an agricultural country with no real war-making base to be destroyed. (OER judgment.) No steel-making capacity and only 5,000 tons of pig iron were produced per month in 1965. (OER judgment)

p.3 NVN ability to continue its aggression depends on imports of war-supporting material (OER judgment).

p.3 And transshipment to South. NVN has highly diversified transportation system (OER judgment).

p.3-4 System now required to carry only small volume of traffic compared to its capacity (OER judgment).

p.4 Precise amount of infiltrated requirements not known. Intelligence estimates -- approximately 15 tons a day of external supplies other than food -- current level of combat. This implies that food could all be procured in country or from Cambodia. (OER judgment.) (15 tons, OER number from 14.3) ^a the published testimony figure of "significantly under 100 tons per day" was used.

p.4 Capacity of Laotian Panhandle road net is more than 200 tons per day. (OER/DIA concurred figure.)

p.4 January-July 1967 -- average 9,000 sorties per month over NVN. January-July 1967 -- average 4,000 sorties per month over Laos. (Published testimony added these to hide Laos number.) Seventy-five percent against LOCs. (Not provided by OER and no objection.)

p.4 Reported destruction - over 4,100 vehicles
- 7,400 water craft
- 1,400 rolling stock (CIA/DIA monthly.)

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p.4 Struck - approximately 1,900 fixed targets (number not provided by OER, but statement implies that essentially all targets in existence have been struck. On p. 7 1,900 given as total number of targets minus the 57 not authorized.)
- including 57 bridges (not provided by OER, many more bridges hit)
- including 50 major rail yards (not provided by OER)

p.4 Manpower diversion for repair work - 300,000 full-time (OER)
- 300,000 part-time (OER)
- 80,000 for air and sea defense (OER)
(Published testimony omitted 80,000 figure.)

p.5 No evidence that bombing short of against the population would force submission. (~~OER judgment~~)

p.5 RT program under constant review to maximize its cost to NVN and minimize price of U.S. pilots.

p.6 No improvements and refinements of air power can do more than put high price on NVN's aggression. (OER judgment)

p.6 JCS target list has 427 targets.
JCS do not now recommend 68 for attack.
427-68 = 359 of which 302 authorized. 359-302 = 57 not authorized, 57 includes for example small tire plant and 9 POL storage with only .6% of capacity. (Not from OER but consistent.) Published testimony adds that of 41 remaining, 25 are lesser targets in populated heavily defended areas; 4 are significant targets in such areas, 3 ports, 4 airfields, and 5 in Chicom buffer zone.

~~Published testimony says here that only 20 MIG's are based in North Vietnam.~~

A few targets out for political reasons -- confrontation with Chinese and USSR.

p.7 Airfields not authorized on grounds of effectiveness/loss consideration. MIG inventory changed from 27 to 26 by OER and given as "approximately 20" in published testimony.

p.7 Total number of fixed targets is 1,900.

p.7 Critics argue for different objectives. Air war can win war in South by:
(1) Breaking will in North.
(2) Cutting off supplies.

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p.7 (Continued)

This would require closing ports. Because of discipline and low standard of living doubtful that will could be broken.

p.9 Eighty percent electricity out and pre-bombing capacity only one-fifth of PEPCO plant in Alexandria provided by OER. Sufficient electricity for war related activities and essential services can be provided by the some 2,000 diesel-driven generating sets which are in operation. (OER estimate)

p.10 Course of conflict in South, rather than scale of attack in North appears to be the determining factor in NVN's willingness to continue.

p.10 Twenty percent of men dispatched from north are lost. Two percent are casualties of air attacks. (These data are from our S-2429 of 7 August 1967. Ten to twenty percent was used in published testimony as we requested in our comments.)

p.11 Much more than two percent of supplies sent south are destroyed. (OER has never estimated this.) All out attacks could destroy more, but requirement is small and only an annihilation campaign against NVN and its people could successfully stop the minimal supply needed because capacity so far exceeds requirement. (OER judgment)

p.12 Bombing and mining ports would interfere seriously. But this wouldn't stop the minimal requirement for SVN. Less than 100 tons per day of non food requirements is dwarfed by the 5,800 tons per day of imports. (OER estimate)

p.12 4,700 of 5,800 tons per day through Haiphong (OER estimate). Draft said, 4,700 includes 75 tons of war supporting material - trucks, generators, etc. (OER has made no judgment on this.) In the published testimony the statement was made but without a number.

Little if any of the 340 tons per day of military equipment comes by sea, changed to 550 in testimony as per OER request.

Draft: If all sea imports were stopped, NVN could still import over 8,000 tons per day. Published testimony used 8,400 tons per day. (Both OER numbers - estimate and re estimate.)

Published testimony also included statement that, the ports together with the roads and railroads from China have an estimated capacity of about 14,000 tons per day. (OER estimate from MAC IV.)

If rail, road, and water capacities were cut by 50 percent, NVN could import 75 (70 in published version) percent of current imports. (Follows from data above.)

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p.13 Sea imports would continue as now with POL by lighter anyway. POL stocks equal 120 days of consumption. (OER/DIA number)